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Executive Summary
The future paths of 401(k) contributions and withdrawals, and the asso-
ciated path of 401(k) asset values, will affect both the preparation of fu-
ture retirees for their retirement years and the income tax revenues of
federal and state governments. In this paper, we project the future
growth of assets in self-directed personal retirement plans, such as
401(k) plans, at age 65 for cohorts attaining that age between now and
2040. We also project the ratio of 401(k) assets at 65 to prior earnings, and
the ratio of aggregate 401(k) account balances to GDP. While there is
substantial uncertainty in the future path of 401(k) balances, our projec-
tions of the future means for these balances suggest that cohorts that at-
tain age 65 in future decades will have accumulated substantially more
retirement saving (in real dollars) than current retirement-age cohorts.
Our projections also highlight the drag that preretirement withdrawals
and management fees place on asset accumulation.
2.1 Introduction
Over the past two and a half decades there has been a fundamental
change in saving for retirement in the United States. Employer-
managed deﬁned beneﬁt pensions have been eclipsed by deﬁned con-
tribution retirement saving plans that are largely controlled by employ-
ees. In 1980, 92 percent of contributions to private retirement saving
plans were to employer plans–64 percent of these contributions were to
deﬁned beneﬁt plans. By 2000, about 87 percent of private contributions
were to plans in which individuals decide how much to contribute to the
plan, how to invest plan assets, and how and when to withdraw money
from the plan. This proportion declined somewhat as employers made“catch-up” contributions to under-funded deﬁned beneﬁt plans in the
period of weak stock market returns beginning in 2000.
In this chapter we develop projections of the future contribution ﬂows
to, withdrawals from, and assets in self-directed personal retirement
plans. 401(k) plans are the most important of the large number of per-
sonal retirement plans. We consider them as well as 403(b), 457, and
other tax-deferred retirement saving plans, as well as traditional de-
ﬁned contribution plans. We refer to these plans collectively as 401(k) or
as 401(k)-type plans. In a companion paper, Poterba, Venti, and Wise
(2007a), we project future asset holdings in deﬁned beneﬁt plans.
The shift from deﬁned beneﬁt to deﬁned contribution plans has po-
tentially important implications not only for the well-being of future re-
tirees, but also for the projection of federal income tax revenues. Contri-
butions to 401(k)-type plans reduce taxable income, and the average
amount of 401(k) wealth that retirees accumulate inﬂuences taxes paid
after retirement. The time proﬁle of withdrawals from these plans af-
fects the time proﬁle and the present discounted value of tax liabilities.
We combine projections of future 401(k) participation rates and asset
accumulation patterns—based on historical cohort data on 401(k) par-
ticipation rates—with the Social Security Administration’s demo-
graphic forecasts to project the stock of 401(k) retirement plan assets in
each year between 2006 and 2040. We also project accumulated 401(k)
assets at age sixty-ﬁve for all cohorts attaining age sixty-ﬁve between
2006 and 2040.
Our study is closely related to several other recent investigations of
the future path of retirement plan assets. Holden and VanDerhei (2002a,
2002b, 2006) project the proportion of pre retirement income that will be
replaced by the 401(k) accumulations of future retirees. They simulate
future 401(k) assets for individuals who had 401(k) accounts in 2000.
Their forecasts do not track aggregate 401(k) assets, since they do not
consider future increases in 401(k) participation rates or the entry of new
workers to the labor market in future years. Both of these factors will
continue to raise future 401(k) balances. The Congressional Budget Of-
ﬁce (2004a, 2004b) projects asset ﬂows into and out of deﬁned beneﬁt
(DB) plans, deﬁned contribution (DC) plans, and individual retirement
accounts (IRAs). Their projections are based primarily on the 1997 In-
formation Returns Master ﬁle from the IRS, supplemented with data
from the Survey of Consumer Finances and Form 5500. Their projections
of future DC balances assume that future participation and contribution
rates will remain ﬁxed at their 1997 age-speciﬁc rates. If 401(k) plans
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tion rates constant will understate future 401(k) balances.
This chapter is organized into ﬁve sections. In the ﬁrst section, we de-
scribe the spread of 401(k) saving programs since these saving plans ﬁrst
became widely available in the early 1980s. In the second section, we ex-
plain how we project the level of future assets in 401(k) plans. We detail
key assumptions about employment trends, participation rates, contri-
bution rates, and withdrawal patterns once 401(k) participants reach re-
tirement. The third section reports projections of 401(k) assets at age
sixty-ﬁve for each cohort that retires between now and 2040, as well as
the total value of 401(k) plan assets for each year until 2040. We also com-
pare projected 401(k) assets with our projection of future assets in DB
plans. In section four, we discuss the key sources of uncertainty in our
projections. The conclusion summarizes our results and discusses their
implications.
2.2 The Spread of 401(k) Plans between 1984 and 2003
This section summarizes the diffusion of 401(k)-type plans over the last
twenty-ﬁve years. It draws heavily on Poterba, Venti, and Wise’s (2007b)
work. Data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
are used to track the spread of 401(k) plans and to develop projections
of future 401(k) assets. Various SIPP surveys provide data on eligibility
for and participation in 401(k) plans in 1984, 1987, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998,
and 2003. Each survey is a random cross-section sample of the popula-
tion and these cross-sections can be used to create synthetic cohorts. For
example, to construct cohort data for the cohort that was twenty-ﬁve
years old in 1984, we use the 1984 panel to obtain data for twenty-ﬁve
year olds in 1984, the 1987 panel to obtain data for persons who were
twenty-eight in that year, the 1991 panel to obtain data for persons who
were thirty-two in that year, and so forth. The cohort that was twenty-
ﬁve in 1984 was forty-four in 2003. We sometimes label a cohort by its
age in 1984 and sometimes by the year in which it attains age sixty-ﬁve.
We refer interchangeably to the cohort that was twenty-ﬁve in 1984, and
will turn sixty-ﬁve in 2024, as the C25 or the R2024 cohort.
The unit of observation in the SIPP—and the basis for most of our cal-
culations—is the individual. In addition, we sometimes present results
for families by grouping individual responses, treating unmarried per-
sons as single-person families, and matching spouses to create two-
person family units. A family is eligible for (or participates in) a 401(k)
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in a plan. The age of a two-person family is assumed to be the age of the
male spouse.
We ﬁrst consider data on family eligibility, organized by cohort. The
SIPP provides some data for ﬁfty-four cohorts (C11 to C64). Figure 2.1
shows cohort data for nine of the ﬁfty-four cohorts, ﬁve years apart, de-
noted by the cohort’s age in 1984. Consider cohort C25. In 1984, about 7
percent of C25 cohort families, which had male heads-of-family twenty-
ﬁve years old, were eligible for a 401(k) plan. By 1987, eligibility had
risen to about twenty percent. By 2003, when the members of this cohort
were forty-four years old, 401(k) eligibility was slightly more than 70
percent. The most important feature of the ﬁgure is the increase in eligi-
bility over time for families of a given age. For example, the dashed ver-
tical line highlights the increase in the eligibility of families in cohorts
that attained age forty in successively later years. When cohort C40 was
forty years old in 1984, about 16 percent of the cohort families were eli-
gible for a 401(k). When cohort C35 attained age forty in 1989, about 34
percent of the C35 cohort was eligible. The C25 cohort was forty in 1999,
and almost 70 percent of cohort families were 401(k)-eligible. Similar in-
creases in eligibility are evident at other ages.
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Figure 2.1
401(k) eligibility data for 9 cohorts, C15 to C55Figure 2.2 shows eligibility data for every cohort for which data can
be obtained from the SIPP—cohorts from C11 to C64. The youngest co-
horts are shown in the upper left of the ﬁgure and the oldest are shown
in the lower right. The SIPP does not present data on 401(k) eligibility for
those under the age of twenty-ﬁve. The C11 cohort in ﬁgure 2.2 is ob-
served twice—once at age twenty-ﬁve in 1998 and again at age thirty in
2003. Cohorts younger than the C11 cohort were younger than age
twenty-ﬁve in 1998, and were thus only observed once—in 2003. These
cohorts are not shown in the ﬁgure.
The dashed vertical lines highlight increases in eligibility for cohorts
that reached given ages in successively later years. With a few excep-
tions, cohorts that reached a given age in successively later years had
successively higher 401(k) eligibility rates. There are surprisingly few
cross-overs in the individual cohort trends, even though cohorts de-
picted in the ﬁgure are only one year apart in age.
The increase in eligibility rates reﬂects the spread of 401(k) plans to
more ﬁrms and especially to smaller employers. Poterba, Venti, and
Wise (2004) explain that a large fraction of the employers who adopted
401(k) plans in the early and mid-1980s also offered DB plans. Few dis-
continued their DB plan when the 401(k) plan was adopted. Employers
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Figure 2.2
401(k) eligibility data for all cohorts, C11 to C64who instituted 401(k) plans later were less likely to have existing DB
plans and were typically smaller ﬁrms.
The participation rates in 401(k) plans show patterns similar to those
for eligibility rates. Family participation rates in 401(k) plans are shown
by cohort in ﬁgures 2.3 and 2.4. Once again, the dashed vertical lines
highlight the increase in the participation rate of families who attained
a given age in successively later years. For example, ﬁgure 2.3 shows
that only about 10 percent of the C40 cohort, those who were forty years
old in 1984, participated in a 401(k) plan. But over 50 percent of the C25
cohort, which turned forty in 1999, participated in a 401(k) plan. Figure
2.4 shows more detail: participation rates for all of the SIPP cohorts.
The cohort ﬁgures show a large increase in both 401(k) eligibility and
participation rates between 1984 and 2003. Cohorts that reached a given
age in successively later years had successively higher eligibility and
participation rates. Table 2.1 summarizes the increase in eligibility and
participation rates at selected ages between 1984 and 2003. It presents
data for the age intervals 30–34, 45–49 and 60–64 in 1984 and 2003. While
only 14.8 percent of the families in the 30–34 cohort in 1984 were eligible
for a 401(k) plan, 66.8 percent of those who reached that age in 2003 were
eligible. Only 8.2 percent of the cohort that attained age 30–34 in 1984
participated in a 401(k) plan, compared with 53.9 percent of the cohort
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Figure 2.3
401(k) participation data for 9 cohortsthat reached this age in 2003. The rise in 401(k) contribution and partic-
ipation behavior that we ﬁnd in the SIPP data is conﬁrmed in other stud-
ies using other data sets, such as Dushi and Honig’s (2007) analysis of
the Health and Retirement Survey.
Table 2.1 also shows the percent of 401(k) eligible workers who par-
ticipated in 401(k) plans in 1984 and 2003. For each age the participation
rate, given eligibility, increased substantially over this period. For ex-
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Figure 2.4
401(k) participation data for all cohorts
Table 2.1




1984 14.8 17.2 9.1
2003 66.8 68.7 53.1
Participation
1984 8.2 11.8 6.3
2003 53.9 59.0 41.0
Participation Rate Given Eligibility
1984 55.5 68.6 69.0
2003 80.7 85.9 77.2ample, in 1984 55.5 percent of eligible families with heads-of-family
aged 30–34 participated in a 401(k) plan. By 2003, 80.7 percent of those
who were eligible participated. Among heads-of-family aged 45–49,
participation given eligibility increased from 68.6 percent to 85.9 percent
between 1984 and 2003.
Figure 2.5 presents data on participation rates (given eligibility). This
conditional participation rate increased between 1984 and 2003 for all
age groups, especially for younger ones. In 2003 the participation rate
(given eligibility) was about the same (80 percent) for each of the age in-
tervals from 40–44 to 60–64. It was higher for younger cohorts.
The rapid spread of 401(k) eligibility and the rise in participation rates
has resulted in sharp growth in aggregate 401(k) contributions. Figure
2.6 shows contributions to 401(k) plans and to all other private pension
plans from 1975 to 2002, the most recent year for which we could access
Form 5500 data. The data are presented in nominal dollars. Contribu-
tions to 401(k) plans are shown by the lined bars. Contributions to 401(k)
plans were ﬁrst made in 1982. By 2000 they had reached 182 billion dol-
lars and accounted for 73 percent of all private pension plan contribu-
tions. Counting IRA, Keogh, and traditional employer provided non-
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Figure 2.5
401(k) participation percent given eligibility, by age interval, 1984 and 2003401(k) DC plans, 87 percent of contributions were to personal accounts.
This fell to 61 percent by 2002 due to large DB catch-up contributions
triggered by the stock market decline.
The increase in total pension plan contributions between 1982 and
2000 was accounted for almost entirely by the increase in contributions
to 401(k) plans. Contributions to deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) plans ﬂuctuated
substantially over this period. In nominal dollars, contributions to these
plans in 2000 were 13.5 billion lower than in 1981—in constant 2000 dol-
lars, the decline was more than 54 billion. DB plan contributions more
than tripled between 2000 and 2002, however, in response to the stock
market decline and the corresponding decline in plan funding status.
Contributions to non-401(k) deﬁned contribution (DC) plans changed
little between 1981 and 2002. There was a substantial spike in IRA con-
tributions in 1982 through 1986. Thereafter IRA contributions fell by
about 75 percent, when the tax advantage of IRA contributions was re-
duced for a small proportion of contributors. Since 1987, the sum of IRA
and Keogh plan contributions has changed very little. Most inﬂows to
IRAs today are roll-overs of previous accumulations in DC plan ac-
counts.
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Figure 2.6
Private pension plan contributions, 1975–2002, in current dollars2.3 Projecting Future 401(k) Contributions
This section describes the calculations that underlie our projections of
401(k) wealth. We denote persons by the subscript i and cohorts by the
subscript c. Associated with each person in each cohort is a lifetime earn-
ings proﬁle. Earnings of person iin cohort cat age aare denoted by Eci(a).
The zero-one indicator that person i in cohort c participates in a 401(k)
plan at age a is denoted by P ci(a), the rate of return earned on 401(k) as-
sets that were held at the beginning of the year when the person attained
age a is denoted by Rci(a), and the contribution rate as a share of earnings
is  . The total contribution by person i in cohort c at age a is therefore
Cci(a) =   ∗Eci(a)∗P ci(a). The value of the 401(k) assets held by person i in






[1   Rci(a   j)] Cci(a   t). (1)
This calculation is made for every person using that individual’s earn-
ings history—we consider individuals of every age in every cohort. In
practice, we distinguish between 401(k) assets held in stocks and bonds,
and make separate accumulation calculations for each individual. The
same rates of return is assumed for all individuals. The 401(k) wealth of






[1   Rci(65   j)] Cci(65   t). (2)
We calculate 401(k) wealth using the earnings history for each indi-
vidual in the sample and then obtain the average wealth held by the
population of all sixty-ﬁve year-olds in a given cohort. To do this we
need to know how many persons of type i are in the population. The
number of persons with lifetime earnings proﬁle iin cohort cat age 65 is
denoted by Nci. The average of 401(k) assets held by all persons in cohort
c at age 65 is given by:
W  c(65)  ∑
i   Wci(65), (3)
where J is the number of individuals in our sample. In practice, we do
not have population forecasts associated with each earnings history in
the sample. We use projections from the Ofﬁce of the Actuary of the So-
cial Security Administration (SSA) for individuals by gender, marital
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Wci(65) separately for each of the four gender-marital status pairs. We
denote this average by Wc,gm. Average wealth at sixty-ﬁve for each cohort
is then:
W  c(65)  ∑
gm   W  c,gm(65). (4)
The sum is over the four gender-marital status groups, and the number
of persons in each of these groups is taken from the SSA demographic
projections.
We project total 401(k) assets in each year through 2040. The 401(k) as-
sets of person i in cohort c in calendar year y equals Wci(y – c   65). The
total value of 401(k) assets in year yis just the sum of these person-cohort
values across all persons and cohorts.
To implement these calculations we need to project future 401(k) partic-
ipation rates and earnings, and to make assumptions about future 401(k)
contribution rates, rates of return, cash-out probabilities, and 401(k) with-
drawals. We begin by describing our projections of average 401(k) partici-
pation rates for each cohort. We then describe our other assumptions.
2.3.1 Participation Rates
We use SIPP data for 1984, 1987, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, and 2003 to track
the spread of 401(k) plans over the past two decades and to project fu-
ture 401(k) participation rates. We begin with historical participation
rates for individuals by cohort, as shown in ﬁgure 2.7. The earliest SIPP
data are for 1984 and the most recent data are for 2003. We use these data
to project 401(k) participation at ages twenty-ﬁve through sixty-ﬁve for
a large number of cohorts, ranging from the one that attains age sixty-
ﬁve in 1982 through the one that attains age sixty-ﬁve in 2040. Only a few
of the cohorts (shown in the bottom right of ﬁgure 2.7) had attained age
sixty-ﬁve by 2003. Thus, for all but a few of the cohorts we must project
participation rates from the last observed age in 2003 to age sixty-ﬁve.
The participation rate is the eligibility rate times the participation rate
given eligibility. The future eligibility rate will depend in particular on
the spread of 401(k) plans to small employers. Poterba, Venti, and Wise
(2004) show that eligibility rates have increased rapidly over the past
two decades, and that participation (given eligibility) increased sub-
stantially over the 1984 to 2003 period. We have not found a compelling
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rates and use them to project future cohort participation rates for per-
sons in cohorts not covered in the SIPP data.
Simple extrapolations of the cohort data yield implausibly large fu-
ture participation rates. Consider, for example, the participation rates at
age forty-four highlighted by the vertical dashed line in ﬁgure 2.7. The
C44 cohort attained age forty-four in 1984 and had a participation rate
of 5.8 percent at that time. The C25 cohort attained age forty-four in 2003
(nineteen years later) and had a participation rate of 44.3 percent. On av-
erage, the participation rate at age forty-four increased about 2 percent-
age points with each successively younger cohort. Were this to continue,
the participation rate of the C12 cohort at age forty-four, in 2016, would
be 70.3 percent (44.3   13   2). We suspect that this is too high because
401(k) plans have already diffused through the segments of the corpo-
rate population with the largest workforces. The early adopters of
401(k)s are also likely to have been the ﬁrms whose workforces found
these plans most attractive, and for which the per employee administra-
tive costs of plan implementation were lowest.
Cohort effects estimated from the proﬁles above show some com-
pression with successively younger cohorts. In addition, ﬁgure 2.7 sug-
gests that within cohorts the increase in participation rates was lower
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Figure 2.7
401(k) participation rate for persons, by cohortbetween the last two data points for each cohort, 1998 and 2003, than for
earlier intervals of comparable length. These features of the data suggest
that the rate of growth of 401(k) participation may be slowing.
To recognize the apparent compression in the cohort effects and the
apparent decline in the rate of within-cohort increase in participation
rates, we make future projections for each cohort based on its observed
2003 participation rate. We assume that the annual increase in future
participation rates will be smaller than the increase between 1998 and
2003—in particular, that this annual rate of increase declines by 0.12 per-
cent per year. With this assumption, we obtain the projected future par-
ticipation rates for the C25 and the C12 cohorts that are shown in ﬁgure
2.8. The ﬁgure also shows the actual participation rates for these cohorts
in 2003 and earlier years. Based on these projections, the participation
rate of the C12 cohort when it attains age forty-four in 2016 would be
61.7 percent. This can be compared with 44.3 percent, the participation
rate at age forty-four for the C25 cohort, which reached this age in 2003.
The projected participation rate of the C25 cohort when it attains age
sixty-four in 2024 is 56.6 percent, while that of the C12 cohort when it at-
tains age sixty-four in 2037 is 69.4 percent. The average projected partic-
ipation rate of all cohorts in 2037 is substantially lower than the partici-
pation rate of the cohort that attains age sixty-four in 2037. We project
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Figure 2.8
Projected participation rates for cohorts C25 (R2024) and C12 (R2037)that the average 401(k) participation rate will increase from 46 percent
in 2003 to 61 percent in 2040.
Figure 2.9 shows the projected average participation rates after 2003
for selected cohorts. The ﬁgure also shows the interpolated participation
rates between the years for which data are available prior to 2003. There
is a noticeable decline in the rate of growth of 401(k) participation be-
tween 1998 and 2003—the last two years for which SIPP data are avail-
able—for many of the cohorts shown in the ﬁgure. The ﬁgure shows
projections for selected cohorts. The projection algorithm we use in-
cludes projections for all cohorts from C65 (R1984) through C9 (R2040).
The highest projected participation rate at age sixty-ﬁve, 74 percent, is
for the cohort that reaches that age in 2040. The average projected par-
ticipation rate over all cohorts increases from almost 50 percent in 2006
to 61 percent in 2040. Participation rates also vary by the level of earn-
ings, given age and cohort. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2007b) also de-
velop projections that recognize this variation.
2.3.2 Rate of Return and Allocation
Our projections use actual annual pretax rates of return on stocks and
bonds for all years prior to 2005. Beginning in 2006 we make projections
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Figure 2.9
Interpolated (1982–2003) and projected (2004–2040) participation rates for selected
cohortsbased on two rate-of-return scenarios. Ibbotson Associates (2006) re-
ports an arithmetic average real return of 9.2 percent for large company
stocks, 14.3 percent for small company stocks, and 3.1 percent for long-
term corporate bonds over the period 1926–2005.
A number of previous studies of future accumulation in deﬁned con-
tribution accounts or individual account Social Security programs have
assumed that, on average, prospective equity returns will be somewhat
lower than they have been historically. The President’s Commission to
Strengthen Social Security (2001), for example, used equity returns be-
low the historical average in its baseline projections. We recognize the
possibility that future equity returns will be lower than past returns by
focusing ﬁrst on projections that set the average return on equities at 6.2
percent, three hundred basis points below the historical value. We as-
sume that the future average real return on corporate bonds will equal
the historical mean return on this asset class.
For comparison we also show the results of projections that assume
the average future equity return equals the historical equity return. This
implies a real return of 9.2 percent on equities and a real return of 3.2
percent on bonds. We also adopt the Social Security Administration in-
termediate assumption of 2.8 percent inﬂation, as this implies an aver-
age nominal return of 6 percent for bonds.
In both return scenarios, we ﬁrst calculate the pretax returns available
on a portfolio with no pre-retirement cash-outs and no management
fees. We then show results with cash-outs, and then with cash-outs and
management fees. No management fees would correspond roughly to a
setting in which 401(k) investments are held in very low-cost index
funds. To evaluate the effect of management fees on 401(k) asset accu-
mulation, we also make projections that assume annual management
fees of seventy basis points on both stock and bond funds. The cash-out
projections are described in detail below.
The allocation of 401(k) assets between stocks and bonds has an im-
portant inﬂuence on long-term accumulation patterns. We assume that
all participants allocate 60 percent of 401(k) contributions to large-
capitalization equities and 40 percent to corporate bonds. The actual al-
location may vary substantially depending on the investment options in-
cluded in individual ﬁrm plans. Recent evidence suggests that this 60/40
split may be more conservative than actual choices. Fidelity Investments
(2006) reports that in the years 2001 to 2005, between 68 and 77 percent of
annual employee contributions to plans for which Fidelity Investments
was the record-keeper were in equities and between 77 percent and
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(2006) reports that, in 2005, equities accounted for 72 percent of contri-
butions to DC plans for which Vanguard was the record-keeper.
The initial asset allocation of contributions and subsequent rebalanc-
ing decisions affect 401(k) accumulation patterns. We begin by assum-
ing that 401(k) participants do not rebalance their portfolios—an as-
sumption that is supported by empirical evidence. Yamaguchi, Mitchell,
Mottola, and Utkus (2007) analyze the trades of about one million Van-
guard 401(k) participants between January 2003 and December 2004.
They ﬁnd that only 3.1 percent of trades represent active rebalancing,
and that “most 401(k) plan participants are characterized by profound
inertia, tending to buy and hold.” Fidelity Investments (2006) ﬁnds that
the large majority of participants chooses not to exchange assets in any
given year. “In 2005, 86% of participants did not make any exchanges;
8% made exchanges on only one day; and 2% made exchanges on four
or more days. The consistency of these ﬁndings over time indicates that
most participants have not rebalanced their accounts on a regular ba-
sis.” Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) ﬁnd that 73 percent of persons in their
TIAA-CREFF sample made no change in asset allocation over the ten
year study period, and another 14 percent made only one change. They
ﬁnd no evidence of age-related reductions in equity exposure. Agnew,
Balduzzi, and Sunden (2003) analyze data for a single employer with
seven thousand accounts between 1994 and 1998 and ﬁnd that “on av-
erage over 87% of the participants make no trades during a year.”
These studies suggest very little trading activity of any kind in 401(k)
accounts. The frequency of rebalancing is likely to be even lower than
the frequency of trading because not all of the exchanges that are made
are for the purpose of rebalancing. Some are triggered by changes in the
menu of investment options offered by employers, and others may re-
ﬂect return-chasing rather than rebalancing.
The absence of substantial rebalancing in many accounts was one of
the motivations for the creation of life-cycle or target retirement date
funds. These funds rebalance on behalf of investors by imposing a tar-
get equity exposure that is age-related. The share of the funds’assets in
equities declines as the participant approaches retirement. The Invest-
ment Company Institute (2006) reports that, in 2005, nearly 50 percent of
401(k) plans offered a lifecycle fund. Vanguard Group (2006) shows that,
in 2005, two-thirds of the plans administered by Vanguard offered a life-
cycle option. Moreover, 28 percent of 401(k) participants who were of-
fered a life-cycle option used it. Overall, 9 percent of DC assets adminis-
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cycle funds is likely to increase the frequency of rebalancing in the fu-
ture. To help to understand how this will affect the accumulation of as-
sets in 401(k) plans, we present some projections that assume 401(k)
assets are invested exclusively in a life-cycle fund in which the percent
of assets in equities at each age is equal to 110–age. This formula ap-
proximates the equity exposure of the life cycle funds discussed in
Poterba, Rauh, Venti, and Wise (2006).
2.3.3 Job Separation, Lump Sum Distributions, and Cashouts
At age twenty-ﬁve each person is assigned to a 401(k) job based on the
participation probability for that person’s age, cohort, and earnings. In
subsequent years each person either remains in the 401(k) job or leaves
the 401(k) job. Table 2.2shows job separation rates for ﬁve-year intervals
estimated from the 1998 SIPP. Separation rates are allowed to vary by
age, but not by time in job. Estimated annual rates range from a high of
23 percent for the youngest workers to 12.1 percent for workers age ﬁfty
to ﬁfty-four. After leaving a 401(k) job, persons enter a pool of non par-
ticipants. In each year, members of this pool are selected for a new 401(k)
job at a rate that makes the overall participation rate for persons of a par-
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Table 2.2
Cashout: Probability of Job Separation, Probability of Lump Sum Distribution (LSD)
Conditional on Job Separation, and Probability of Cashout Conditional on LSD
Probability of  Probability of
job separation∗ LSD|separation* Probability of cashout|LSD∗∗
Age Percent Percent Size of distribution Percent of dollars cashed-out
25–29 23.0 57 < $1,000 77.2
30–34 15.6 57 1,000–2,000 67.7
35–39 15.6 57 2,000–5,000 49.6
40–44 13.6 57 5,000–10,000 52.8
45–49 13.9 57 10,000–15,000 39.1
50–54 12.1 57 15,000–25,000 37.8
55–59 12.5 57 25,000–50,000 28.8
60–64 15.7 57 50,000–100,000 8.2
> $100,000 10.2
All 15.1 57 27.2
∗Authors’calculation based on SIPP data.
∗∗From Hurd, Lilliard, and Panis (1998), based on HRS data.ticular age and cohort equal to the projected probability for that age and
cohort. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2001) describe a similar projection al-
gorithm with an identical treatment of transitions into and out of 401(k)
participation.
The probability that a 401(k) accumulation is cashed out is deter-
mined by the job separation rate, the probability that the employee takes
a lump sum distribution (LSD), and the probability that a lump sum dis-
tribution is cashed out rather than rolled over into an IRA:
Pr(cashout)   Pr(job separation) ∗ Pr(LSD) ∗ Pr(LSD cashout).
Table 2.2 shows the probabilities associated with each of the components
of the cash-out decision.
When employees separate from a job they may choose to keep their
accumulation with their old employer or to take a LSD. The SIPP pro-
vides information on the disposition of LSDs but it does not record in-
formation on situations in which a job changer chose not to take an LSD.
This makes it impossible to use SIPP data to estimate the probability of
a potential LSD, given job separation. Instead, we use the average rate of
57 percent obtained by Hurd, Lilliard, and Panis (1998) from data in the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS). On average, the probability that a
dollar in a 401(k) account is cashed out in a given year is (0.151)  (0.570)
 (0.272)  0.0234. The probability depends on a person’s age and on the
level of 401(k) assets. For someone between the ages of sixty and sixty-
four with assets between ﬁfty thousand dollars and one-hundred thou-
sand dollars, for example, the probability is about 0.006—well below the
average across all potential cashouts. To make projections for future
years, the cutoff points for potential LSDs in table 2.2 are indexed to
nominal wage growth, which is 3.9 percent per year in the Social Secu-
rity Administration intermediate case.
The cash-out probabilities in our projections differ from the probabil-
ities in Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2001), which averaged about 0.0108.
The principle reason for the difference is a difference in job separation
rates between that study and this one. In the earlier paper, Poterba,
Venti, and Wise used estimates based on retrospective information in
the HRS—which yielded a separation rate of 0.048, well below the aver-
age rate of 0.151 based on the SIPP estimates or Stewart’s (2002) estimate
of nearly twenty percent from the Current Population Survey. In the pa-
per the average estimate of the (probability of a LSD)   (probability of
cashout | LSD) was 0.226. The average of these two components here is
smaller: (0.570)   (0.272)   0.155.
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Our projections assume a very simple pattern of withdrawals from
401(k) accounts. Annual withdrawals are assumed to be two percent of
balances between ages 65 and 70.5. At older ages, the amount with-
drawn from the 401(k) is (1/Remaining Life Expectancy) times the
401(k) balance. These withdrawal assumptions may overstate prospec-
tive withdrawals and, thereby, understate asset balances at older ages.
Bershadker and Smith (2006) report that over 50 percent of current IRA
holders who are over seventy made no withdrawals before age seventy.
HRS data for 2004 suggest that the percent of IRAholders making with-
drawals in the past year ranged from about 5 percent at age ﬁfty-ﬁve to
30 percent at age seventy. The percent of assets withdrawn, at all ages,
was probably less than the rate of return. Love and Smith (2007) show
that for a sample of HRS retired respondents, the income accruing to as-
sets in tax-deferred retirement accounts exceeded withdrawals from
these accounts—so account balances were rising during retirement. We
assume withdrawal rates beginning at age seventy-one are much higher
than current required minimum withdrawals. For example, between
ages seventy-one and ninety we assume withdrawal rates rise from 6.13
percent to 18.18 percent. The required minimum distributions under
current law are much lower, ranging from 3.77 to 8.77 percent over this
age range.
2.3.5 Earnings
To estimate a cohort’s 401(k) contributions, we need to determine the
earnings and the contribution rates of cohort members. The key to de-
veloping an earnings history is access to a long time series of earnings by
a single individual or family. We use the HRS, which provides linked So-
cial Security earnings histories for respondents who agreed to the link.
These data represent earnings histories for a sample of individuals who
were between the ages of ﬁfty-two and sixty-one in 1992. We assume im-
plicitly that the distribution of earnings histories that will be realized by
younger cohorts will be similar to the distribution of earnings histories
of the HRS respondents.
To develop earnings histories for younger cohorts we begin with the
Social Security earnings histories of the HRS respondents, available for
the years 1951 through 1991. We used a two-limit tobit speciﬁcation—
with a separate equation for each year—to impute earnings for individ-
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limit. Earnings for 1992 through 2000 are obtained directly from HRS re-
spondents. We begin with the earnings of the cohorts that attained age
sixty-ﬁve in 1998, 1999, and 2000. We obtain lifetime earnings for all
single persons that attained age sixty-ﬁve in these years, and for all per-
sons in two-person families in which the male partner attained age
sixty-ﬁve in these years. The earnings of the 1998 cohort are aged two
years and the earnings of the 1999 cohort are aged one year, based on the
Social Security average wage index. We then treat these earnings histo-
ries as a random sample of the earnings of the cohort that attained age
sixty-ﬁve in 2000 (the R2000 cohort). The sample reports actual earnings
histories—including years with zero earnings—so it recognizes that in-
dividuals may not be employed in some years. We implicitly assume
that the employment rate and the distribution of employment by age are
similar for future cohorts as for past ones. Note that the R2000 cohort
contains some female spouses who were not sixty-ﬁve in 2000.
To project the earnings of younger cohorts, we inﬂate the R2000
sample using the intermediate earnings growth assumptions reported
in the 2005 annual report of the Board of Trustees of the Social Security
Administration. Similarly, to project earnings for older cohorts we de-
ﬂate the earning of the R2000 cohort based on the Social Security aver-
age wage index. This method holds ﬁxed the relative earnings of high
and low-wage persons.
2.3.6 Contribution Rate
We assume a contribution rate of 10 percent of earnings, including both
employee and employer contributions. There are several sources of in-
formation on contribution rates. Data from the 2003 SIPP are shown by
age interval in table 2.3. The overall median of the total of employee and
employer contributions is 9.8 percent. The employee and employer me-
dians are 5.7 percent and 3.0 percent respectively. The overall mean is
12.6 percent. Reporting errors may affect the estimated mean. The ﬁnd-
ing that the mean contribution rate exceeds the median is one force that
may lead our mean 401(k) balances to exceed the median for future co-
horts of retirees.
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1998) analyze contribution rates in the 1993
Current Population Survey (CPS) and ﬁnd an average employee contri-
bution rate of 7.1 percent and an average employer rate of 3.1 percent.
Holden and VanDerHei (2001) analyze the responses to an Employee
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survey, and report that in 1999 the average total contribution rate was
9.7 percent. The 1998 Form 5500 data show that about 32 percent of total
contributions are from employers, which is roughly consistent with the
2003 SIPP median percent and with the 1993 CPS values. Engelhardt and
Cunningham (2002) report that—based on HRS data—the average em-
ployee contribution rate was 6.6 percent in 1991, which is also generally
consistent with the estimates based on SIPP and on CPS data.
For several reasons, the contribution rate in future years is uncertain.
One is that legislation in the past several years has increased contribu-
tion limits substantially. Contribution limits are also linked prospec-
tively to inﬂation, so the real value of the contribution limit will not be
eroded as it has sometimes been in the past. The legislated increases in
contribution limits for 401(k) and related plans are summarized in the
appendix. The projections presented here assume that contributions, as
a percent of salary, will be unaffected by the rising limits. In part, the ef-
fect of the limit increases depends on how many participants are con-
strained by the contribution limits now, and whether fewer participants
or more participants will be constrained by future limits. Holden and
VanDerhei (2001) report that in 1999, 11 percent of participants with in-
comes over forty thousand dollars contributed at the legislated maxi-
mum. Among those with incomes between seventy thousand dollars
and eighty thousand dollars, 13 percent were at the contribution limit.
The analogous statistic was 18 percent at incomes between eighty thou-
sand dollars and ninety thousand dollars.
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Table 2.3
Employee and Employer 401(k) Contribution Rates as a Percent of Earnings, for Individ-
uals, Based on 2003 SIPP
Employee Employer Total
Age Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
25–29 6.8 5.0 4.6 3.0 11.4 9.0
30–34 7.7 5.2 4.6 3.0 12.4 9.3
35–39 7.9 5.8 4.7 3.0 12.5 9.7
40–44 7.8 5.7 4.6 3.0 12.4 10.0
45–49 8.0 6.0 4.8 3.0 12.8 10.0
50–54 8.6 6.0 4.3 3.0 13.0 10.0
55–59 9.1 6.0 4.6 3.0 13.7 10.0
60–64 8.7 6.0 4.6 3.0 13.3 10.0
All 8.0 5.7 4.6 3.0 12.6 9.8It is not clear how wage growth will interact with rising contribution
limits to affect the proportion of persons at the limit. Even though the
limits have increased and are now indexed to the CPI, wages are likely
to increase faster than the CPI. The Social Security Administration as-
sumes future wage growth of 3.9 percent and future inﬂation of 2.8 per-
cent. The legislated maximum, however, may not be the effective limit
for many employees. Holden and VanDerhei (2001) report that 52 per-
cent of participants in 1999 faced employer imposed limits below the
legislated maximum. We do not know how many participants are cur-
rently constrained by these limits, or how these limits may change in fu-
ture years. Legislated increases in contribution limits may also affect
participant decisions of how much should be saved for retirement, and
government-set limits may serve to frame employee decisions.
Asecond source of uncertainty arises from the recent enactment of the
Pension Protection Act of 2006, which gives employers latitude to set
more saving friendly defaults in 401(k) plans. Beshears, Choi, Laibson,
and Madrian (forthcoming) survey some of the recent evidence on how
changing defaults for enrollment, contribution rates, and asset alloca-
tion can signiﬁcantly increase retirement saving through 401(k) plans.
Our projections may underestimate future 401(k) assets if new default
options are successful in raising participation and contributions. The
U.S. Department of Labor Employee Beneﬁts Security Association
(2007) projects substantial positive effects of the 2006 legislation on both
participation rates and contribution rates to 401(k) plans. In 2034, for ex-
ample, the study projects between a 70 and 134 billion dollar (2006 dol-
lars) increase in 401(k) contributions.
2.4 Assets in 401(k) Plans at Retirement and Total Assets by Year
In this section we present projections of 401(k) assets at retirement by co-
hort and then consider the total value of assets in 401(k) plans by year.
2.4.1 401(k) Assets at Retirement
Figure 2.10 shows the average per person value of 401(k) assets at age
sixty-ﬁve (2000 dollars). The average is across all members of the cohort,
not just those with 401(k) accounts. There are four projections. The base-
line is one that assumes that equity returns equal their historical values,
less three hundred basis points. The second projection shows accumu-
lated assets assuming cash-outs. The third shows accumulated assets as-
64 Poterba, Venti, and Wisesuming cash-outs as well as management fees of seventy basis points for
investments in both stocks and bonds. Finally, the ﬁgure also shows the
projected present value of DB assets at age sixty-ﬁve, taken from
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2007a).
Without cash-outs or management fees, the projected average value
of 401(k) assets at retirement, averaging across participants and non par-
ticipants, would increase from 33,045 dollars in 2000 to 308,356 dollars
by 2040. The projected increase is due to the increase in the participation
rates of younger cohorts, and to the increase in the number of years that
successively younger cohorts were able to accumulate 401(k) assets. The
401(k) program effectively began in 1982, so cohorts retiring before 2020
could only make contributions over part of their working lives. Persons
who attained age sixty-ﬁve in 2000 could have contributed to a 401(k)
plan for at most eighteen years. For the cohort that will attain age sixty-
ﬁve in 2040, 401(k) plans will have been available over the entire work-
ing life.
If the recent cash-out probabilities described above persist, they will
reduce 401(k) assets at retirement by roughly 11 percent, relative to the
no-cash out baseline. The average value of 401(k) balances in 2040 in this
case would be 274,091 dollars. With management fees of seventy basis
points, the accumulation would be further reduced to 236,664 dollars—
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Figure 2.10
Average 401(k) assets and PV of DB assets at retirement (age 65), by year of retirement,
all persons, assuming stock returns 300 basis points less than historical average23.2 percent below the baseline. Management fees alone would reduce
the accumulation by 13.9 percent. While management fees and leakage
through cash-out of assets before retirement can reduce the accumula-
tion of assets, a reduction in leakage or a reduction in management fees
could correspondingly increase 401(k) accumulations.
For comparison, the average over all persons of the present value of
DB beneﬁts at age sixty-ﬁve reaches its maximum at about 73,000 dollars
in 2003. After that year, the average present value of beneﬁts from DB
plans declines. Between 2009 and 2012 projected assets in 401(k) plans
become greater than the present value of DB beneﬁts at age sixty-ﬁve.
Figure 2.10 shows projected 401(k) assets at age sixty-ﬁve in year 2000
dollars. It is common to consider retirement assets relative to earnings
while working. Figure 2.11, therefore, shows the ratio of average 401(k)
assets at age sixty-ﬁve to average earnings between ages ﬁfty-ﬁve and
sixty for persons attaining age sixty-ﬁve in each year. The ﬁgure also
shows the ratio of average DB wealth to average earnings. Assuming eq-
uity returns equal to historical values less three hundred basis points,
the ratio of 401(k) assets to earnings between ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty would
grow from less than two today to 7.69. With cash-outs, the ratio would
be reduced by 11.1 percent, to 6.84. With cash-outs and management
fees of seventy basis points the ratio would be reduced to 5.91.
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Figure 2.11
Ratio of 401(k) assets and PV of DB beneﬁts to average earnings (ages 55 to 60), at retire-
ment (age 65), by year of retirement, all persons, assuming stock returns 300 basis points
less than historical averageTo place these ratios in context, ﬁgure 2.11 also shows the present
value of DB beneﬁts divided by average earnings between ages ﬁfty-ﬁve
and sixty. The maximum value for this ratio occurs in 1995 when it is
2.75. The ratio was 2.72 in 2003 when the PV of DB beneﬁts reached its
maximum. Thus, even with cash-outs and management fees of seventy
basis points, by 2040 the projected ratio of 401(k) assets to prior earnings
will be more than twice as large as the historical maximum of the ratio
of the present value of DB payouts to earnings.
The projections in Figures 2.10 and 2.11 assume that individuals do
not rebalance their portfolios as they age. Thus by age sixty-ﬁve, a large
fraction of assets are held in equities. For individuals turning sixty-ﬁve
in 2040, we project about 73 percent of assets will be in equities assum-
ing historical returns (less three hundred basis points). While the as-
sumption of little or no active rebalancing is consistent with the behav-
ior of current 401(k) participants, the rise of lifecycle funds may lead to
greater rebalancing in the future. To explore how life-cycle rebalancing
could affect asset accumulation, we project the average 401(k) assets of
persons at age sixty-ﬁve assuming historical rates of equity returns less
three hundred basis points and assuming all 401(k) assets are invested
in a stylized life-cycle fund. Each person is assumed to hold (110 – age)
of their 401(k) balance in equities at each age. Thus a twenty-ﬁve year-
old will hold 85 percent in equities, and someone aged sixty-ﬁve or older
will hold 45 percent in equities. For those early in their careers, our styl-
ized lifecycle fund, as well as actual life-cycle funds offered by mutual
fund providers, allocates a larger share of assets to equity than the 60
percent equity allocation in our baseline projections.
Figure 2.12 shows projections with and without rebalancing. The
baseline in this ﬁgure is projected assets at age 65, assuming historical
returns less three hundred basis points. The life cycle fund projection as-
sumes that all 401(k) participants invest exclusively in the life-cycle
fund. The life cycle allocation has very little effect on the accumulation
of assets: assets at age sixty-ﬁve for those retiring in 2040 are only 2 per-
cent lower than the base accumulation. This reﬂects the combination of
greater equity exposure earlier in life, and less exposure later in life, in
the lifecycle fund than in the no rebalancing scenario.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present more detail on the asset accumulation pro-
ﬁles that are graphed in ﬁgures 2.10 to 2.12. The tables show projections
using historical equity returns (less three hundred basis points) as well
as projections assuming that historical equity returns continue into the
future. Both tables show accumulation at ten year intervals. Table 2.2
New Estimates of the Future Path of 401(k) Assets 67shows dollar values, while table 2.3 shows the ratio of 401(k) assets to
average earnings between ages ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty. Both tables also show
the percent reduction in assets associated with allowing cash-outs and
management fees, and the effect of life cycle rebalancing. In addition,
table 2.2 shows the present value of DB beneﬁts and table 2.3 shows the
ratio of DB beneﬁts to average earnings between ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty.
The tables, like the ﬁgures, show the important drag that manage-
ment fees and leakage due to cash-outs place on the accumulation of
401(k) assets. The percent reduction in accumulation due to these factors
is not very sensitive to our assumption about the level of equity returns.
The effect of life cycle rebalancing does depend on whether we use his-
torical returns or historical returns reduced by three hundred basis
points. Shifting away from equities as the retirement age approaches—
as lifecycle funds do—has a larger impact on average accumulation
when the return on equities is higher.
Finally, to check our projection algorithm, we compared our estimates
of the mean 401(k) assets of persons who attained age sixty-ﬁve in 2000
with the mean 401(k) assets of HRS respondents between the ages of
sixty-three and sixty-seven in 2000. The HRS mean is 25,892 dollars,
while our projected mean is 29,708 dollars. However, the mean 401(k)
balance in the HRS excludes assets that were accumulated in 401(k)
68 Poterba, Venti, and Wise
Figure 2.12
Average 401(k) assets at retirement (age 65), by year of retirement, all persons, assuming






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1plans but later rolled into IRAs; our projected 401(k) balance includes
amounts that were rolled over into an IRA. A large fraction of assets in
IRAs are rollovers from 401(k) plans, and today many new retirees roll
over 401(k) assets into an IRA. Holden, Ireland, Leonard-Chambers, and
Bogdan (2005) report that 89 percent of ﬂows into IRAs in 1996 were
rollovers. The percentages for the next four years were 89, 93, 95, and 96
(respectively). Given the importance of rollovers, our projection seems
plausible relative to the HRS mean. Determining the signiﬁcance of pen-
sion plan-to-IRArollovers is a key issue in evaluating statistics on aver-
age retirement plan balances for recent retirees—such as those in
Munnell and Sunden (2006).
2.4.2 Total 401(k) Assets by Year
The total value of assets in 401(k) plans will increase substantially over
the next three decades. To place the increase in a broader economic con-
text, ﬁgures 2.13 and 2.14 show the total value of 401(k) assets as a pro-
portion of the Social Security Administration intermediate projections
of future GDP. The ﬁgures also show the projected value of assets held
by DB plans—from Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2007a)—relative to GDP
projections. The rise in 401(k) saving and the decline in DB pension sav-
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Figure 2.13
Ratio of projected 401(k) and DB assets to projected GDP by year (historical returns less
300bp)ings means that 401(k) pensions will dominate the pension landscape in
the future. Figure 2.13 shows that total 401(k) assets grew from essen-
tially zero in 1982 to about 37 percent of GDP in 2005. Our projections in-
dicate that 401(k) assets will continue to increase after 2005, reaching 87
percent of GDP in 2040—assuming historical equity returns less three
hundred basis points. Total pension assets, including both 401(k) and
DB assets grow to about 110 percent of GDP in 2040. Again, for compar-
ison, ﬁgure 2.14 shows the projection of total assets if historical returns
were to continue in the future. Under this scenario, 401(k) assets would
grow from about 37 percent of GDP in 2005 to 138 percent of GDP by
2040. Total pension assets, both 401(k) and DB assets, would grow to 161
percent of GDP.
2.5 Summary and Discussion
Over the past two and a half decades there has been a fundamental
change in saving for retirement in the United States. There has been a
rapid shift from saving through employer-managed deﬁned beneﬁt
pensions, to saving through deﬁned contribution retirement saving
plans that are largely controlled by employees. To understand how this
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Figure 2.14
Ratio of projected 401(k) and DB assets to projected GDP by year (historical equity re-
turns)change will affect the well-being of future retirees, we project the future
growth of assets in self-directed personal retirement plans.
Our projections rely on many assumptions. We assume that 401(k)
participation rates will grow in the future but at a much slower rate than
in the past. Realized future participation rates could be lower than our
projections, but could also be much higher as some legislative proposals
have called for policies that would increase 401(k) participation and, in
some cases, make it universal. Recent legislation has also made it much
easier for employees in small ﬁrms to contribute to a personal account
by payroll deduction, which may also increase participation. We assume
a contribution rate that is consistent with recent employee and employer
rates. It is difﬁcult to judge whether this rate is likely to increase or de-
crease in the future. The uncertainty stems from uncertainty about the
effect of future contribution limit increases, the effect of the increasing
use of default options, and the effect of recent legislation. We assume
that current patterns of withdrawal from retirement saving plans will
persist, but some recent evidence on withdrawals from IRAs suggests
that we may overstate withdrawal behavior. We also project asset accu-
mulation, assuming management fees of seventy basis points for both
bond and stock investments.
Assumptions about the rate of return on equities have an important ef-
fect on the projected accumulation of 401(k) assets. We emphasize results
assuming that future equity returns will be three hundred basis points
less than historical returns. For comparison, we also show results as-
suming that historical equity returns continue into the future. We con-
sider scenarios in which 60 percent of contributions are in equities and 40
percent in bonds (with no rebalancing), as well as one with all 401(k) as-
sets rebalanced in line with typical life-cycle funds. Our focus on average
values in our projections should not obscure the substantial uncertainty
of future 401(k) balances. Given the uncertainty of future asset returns,
the potential dispersion of projected future retirement balances is large.
Our projections indicate that the 401(k) assets of persons who attain
age sixty-ﬁve in 2040 will be much greater than the 401(k) assets of per-
sons who attained age sixty-ﬁve in 2000. Assuming the historical rate of
return on equities less three hundred basis points, accounting for cash-
outs, and assuming management fees of seventy basis points on both eq-
uities and bonds, the average 401(k) balance increases from 27,482 dol-
lars in 2000 to 236,684 dollars by 2040. There are three principal reasons
for the growth of average 401(k) assets. First, the 401(k) system was not
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plan for, at most, eighteen years and on average participants had con-
tributed just over seven. Beginning in about 2020, retirees working for
employers offering a 401(k) will have been able to contribute for their
entire working lives. Second, we project continued growth of 401(k) cov-
erage—albeit at a considerably slower rate than in the recent past—as
401(k) plans continue to spread to smaller ﬁrms in the private sector, as
well as to employers in the public sector. Third, future retirees will ben-
eﬁt from real wage growth, assumed to be 1.1 percent per year in our
projections. The increase in the ratio of 401(k) balances at retirement to
preretirement earnings is smaller than the increase in real 401(k) assets.
Our projections imply that the ratio of 401(k) assets to average earn-
ings between ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty would rise to about six by 2040—if fu-
ture equity returns were three hundred basis points less than historical
returns. The implication of such an increase can be judged by recalling
that for years after 2012, projected assets in 401(k) plans at age sixty-ﬁve
exceeded the maximum level of assets ever attained in DB plans. In 2012,
the ratio of 401(k) assets to earnings is projected to be about two and a
half. Thus our projections suggest that on average future retirement as-
sets (relative to earnings) will substantially exceed current levels.
The projections highlight the important drag on asset accumulation
due to pre retirement cash-outs of assets and management fees. To-
gether they reduce—by about 23 percent—the 401(k) accumulation at
retirement for those who turn sixty-ﬁve in 2040. A reduction in either
could increase accumulation substantially. Purcell (2007) illustrates a
similar point.
An important feature of the asset allocation of current 401(k) partici-
pants is the virtual absence of active rebalancing. Life cycle funds were
developed, in part, to assist participants to rebalance by reducing the
fraction of assets in equities and increasing the fraction in bonds as par-
ticipants approach retirement. These funds have been growing rapidly
and by 2005 nearly 50 percent of 401(k) plans offered one. The availabil-
ity of life-cycle funds is expected to increase further following passage
of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, as employers are encouraged to
use life-cycle funds as investment default options. The projections sum-
marized previously in this chapter assume no rebalancing and, thus, the
projected fraction of assets in equities at retirement is large. To under-
stand how assets at retirement would be affected by rebalancing, we
also projected accumulations assuming that 100 percent of contributions
were invested in a life-cycle fund. Assuming historical equity returns
74 Poterba, Venti, and Wise(less three hundred basis points), there is little difference between accu-
mulation under life cycle rebalancing and the accumulation assuming
contributions of 60 percent equities and 40 percent bonds. The reduction
with rebalancing is greater when historical equity returns are as-
sumed—about 16 percent.
To place the growth of 401(k) assets in a broader economic context, we
also calculated the total value of 401(k) assets as a proportion of the So-
cial Security Administration intermediate projections of future GDP (in
year 2000 dollars). Total 401(k) assets grow from essentially zero in 1982,
to about 38 percent of GDP in 2005. Our projections indicate that 401(k)
assets continue to increase after 2005, reaching 87 percent of GDP in 2040
assuming historical equity returns less three hundred basis points. In
addition, we ﬁnd that the decline in DB pension assets is far outweighed
by the increase in 401(k) assets. Total pension assets, including both DB
and 401(k) plans, grow from about 52 percent of GDP in 1982 to 110 per-
cent of GDP in 2040 assuming equity returns are three hundred basis
points below their historical average.
Our focus on the average level of 401(k) wealth at retirement and on
the aggregate amount of retirement wealth accumulation is natural
when considering how changing demographics and pension structure
may affect the aggregate economy, but it can conceal important hetero-
geneity in the retirement circumstances of different households.
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2007b) consider the average growth of 401(k)
assets across the range of possible lifetime earnings trajectories. In par-
ticular, the growth of the sum of Social Security wealth plus 401(k) as-
sets for families in each decile of the Social Security wealth distribution
is emphasized. Our projections show a substantial increase between
2000 and 2040 in the sum of these retirement assets in each wealth decile.
There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the accumulation of
401(k) assets within deciles, with some households substantially greater
than our projected means and others with no 401(k) assets.
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Tax Legislation and Retirement Saving Options: 401(k) and Other
Personal Retirement Accounts
Broad access to personal retirement accounts began in 1982. More recent
legislation has aimed to further increase personal retirement saving. In
particular, both the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and the Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) included
provisions that were designed to induce more retirement saving, princi-
pally through tax-deferred personal retirement accounts. These bills es-
tablished Roth IRAs and increased contribution limits to traditional
IRAs, 401(k) plans, and other personal accounts. EGTRRA also intro-
duced tax credits for low-income taxpayers who make contributions to
IRAs, Roth IRAs, 401(k) plans, and other personal accounts. We describe
here some of the more important recent changes to the IRA and 401(k)
programs.
Contribution Limits for 401(k) Plans
In 2001 there were three restrictions on the amount that could be con-
tributed to a 401(k) plan: (1) a 10,500 dollar limit on the employee’s an-
nual contribution, (2) a 35,000 dollar limit on combined employee and
employer contributions, and (3) combined employee and employer con-
tributions were limited to 25 percent of total compensation. By 2006, the
annual limit on the employee’s contribution had increased to ﬁfteen
thousand dollars, the combined dollar limit had increased to forty thou-
sand dollars, and the percentage limit had increased to 100 percent of
compensation. Both of the dollar limits will be indexed to the CPI be-
ginning in 2007.
Catch-up Contributions to 401(k) Plans
The 2001 legislation also contains a catch-up provision for participants
age ﬁfty or older. The allowable catch-up contribution was one thou-
sand dollars for 2002, and the allowable amount increased in steps to
ﬁve thousand dollars in 2007. After 2007, the catch-up contribution for
401(k)s is indexed to inﬂation.
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Contribution limits to a traditional IRAwere originally set in 1981 at two
thousand dollars per working spouse and two-hundred-ﬁfty dollars for
a nonworking spouse. A provision in the Small Business Job Protection
Act of 1996 raised the deduction available to a non-working spouse from
two-hundred-ﬁfty dollars to two thousand dollars effective in 1997, thus
increasing the combined deduction for a family with a non-working
spouse from 2,250 to 4,000 dollars. The limits have since been raised to
four thousand dollars per person in 2006. The dollar limit will be in-
dexed to the CPI beginning in 2007. The tax-deductibility of the tradi-
tional IRA is phased out for persons covered by an employer pension
with incomes in excess of ﬁfty thousand dollars for single persons and
seventy-ﬁve thousand dollars for married persons in 2006.
Roth IRA
The Roth back-loaded IRAwas introduced in 1997. Contributions to the
Roth IRA are not tax deductible, but no tax is paid upon withdrawal if
the funds are held for at least ﬁve years and if the recipient is over age
ﬁfty-nine and a half. Like the front-loaded (traditional) IRA, the invest-
ment return in a Roth IRA accrues tax-free. Contribution limits and al-
lowances for penalty-free withdrawals are the same as for the tradi-
tional IRA. However, the Roth IRA contribution limit is speciﬁed in
after-tax dollars whereas the traditional IRA limit is in pre-tax dollars.
This means that the potential accumulation of retirement saving is
higher under the Roth IRA. In addition, the income at which eligibility
begins to be phased-out is much higher for the Roth IRA (95–110,000
dollars for single persons and 150–160,000 dollars for married couples)
than for the traditional IRA.
Catch-up Contributions for Traditional and Roth IRAs
The catch-up provision in the 2001 legislation allowed persons age ﬁfty
or older to contribute an extra ﬁve hundred dollars per year between
2002 and 2005, and an extra one thousand dollars per year beginning in
2006. The catch-up contribution amount for IRAs is not indexed to in-
ﬂation.
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Beginning in 2002 and continuing until the end of 2006, taxpayers who
make contributions to personal retirement saving plans—401(k)s,
403(b)s, 457(b)s, traditional or Roth IRAs, and other plans—may receive
a tax credit of up to 50 percent on the ﬁrst two thousand dollars con-
tributed. Eligibility for the deduction is determined by income. For joint
tax ﬁlers, the deduction is 50 percent for those with incomes less than
thirty thousand dollars and is phased out at ﬁfty thousand dollars. For
single tax ﬁlers the deduction is 50 percent for those with incomes less
than ﬁfteen thousand dollars and is phased out at twenty-ﬁve thousand
dollars.
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